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SMOKERS' CHANCES OF A FAIR FIGHT AGAINST THE TOBACCO 
COMPANIES GO UP IN FlAMES: A STUDY OF PHILIP MORRIS 
INC. v. ANGELETTI AND ITS EFFECT ON THE VIABILI1Y 
OF CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS IN MARYLAND TOBACCO 
LITIGATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The use of class action as a litigation device has proven to be the 
most efficient and effective method of adjudicating certain kinds of 
claims. 1 However, many courts at both the state and federal levels 
have expressed great reluctance in certifying class action lawsuits in-
volving mass tort claims.2 Mostly because of the potential for predom-
inance of individual issues, many courts hold that class actions in such 
suits generally do not provide the most judicially economical means 
by which to settle the claims.3 
Maryland courts are no exception.4 Recently, in a four to three de-
cision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Philip Morris Inc. v. 
Angeletti,5 a class action tobacco lawsuit brought against several to-
bacco manufacturers and related companies.6 Judge Edward J. 
Angeletti of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City originally certified 
the class action? However, because no statute existed in Maryland 
allowing interlocutory appeal of a class action certification order,8 the 
defendants requested that the court of appeals grant the extraordi-
nary relief of mandamus and order Judge Angeletti to decertify the 
1. See Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace and Put Options in the Mass Tort 
Class Action, 115 HARv. L. REv. 747 (2002) (noting that class action litiga-
tion is common in the areas of antitrust, consumer, and securities 
litigation). 
2. See In re Rhone-Polenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (ex-
plaining that most federal courts have refused to allow the use of class ac-
tions in mass tort cases); see also In reAgent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 
F.2d 145, 164 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying class certification and stating that 
class actions are inappropriate due to the individualistic nature of the cau-
sation issues); Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 769, 752 A.2d 
200, 244 (2000) (denying class certification based on a lack of a predomi-
nance of issues); Pollokoff v. Md. Nat'l Bank, 288 Md. 485, 501, 418 A.2d 
1201, 1210 (1980). See also infra notes 4-12 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the court of appeals' decision in Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti. 
3. See infra Part IV. 
4. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 787-88, 752 A.2d at 1210; Pollokoff, 288 Md. at 501, 
418 A.2d at 1210; Snell v. Geico Corp., No. CIV. 202160, 2001 WL 1085237 
(Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 14, 2001). 
5. 358 Md. 689, 752 A.2d 200 (2000). 
6. Id. at 699-700, 700 n.2, 752 A.2d at 205, 205 n.2; see also infra Part Ill. 
7. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 699 n.l, 752 A.2d at 205 n.l. 
8. See id. at 706-07, 752 A.2d at 210-11. 
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class.9 Generally in Maryland, an order certifying a class action is only 
appealable on final judgment. 10 However, in this case, not only did 
the court of appeals order Judge Angeletti to decertifY the class action 
based on the extraordinary writ of mandamus, 11 the court of appeals 
also explicitly outlined a myriad of arguments against the future use of 
the class action device to litigate mass tort tobacco claims in Mary-
land.12 Based on the court's comprehensive denial of certification 
and its unique use of the writ of mandamus to overrule Judge 
Angeletti's class certification, this Comment argues that Philip Morris 
Inc. v. Angeletti virtually extinguishes any future possibility that to-
bacco-related lawsuits will be successfully litigated in Maryland, 
whether litigated as class actions or litigated by individuals. 
In analyzing the Angeletti decision and its impact on Maryland law, 
this Comment begins with a discussion of the original purpose and 
historical development of the Maryland rule regarding class action 
certification. 13 Part II provides a comparison of ~tie Maryland rule 
with the corresponding federal rule and an explanation of the policies 
behind and proper usage of the class action device as it is currently 
applied. 14 Part III presents an overview of the facts of Angeletti, as well 
as the analysis and rationale of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
utilizing the extraordinary writ of mandamus as a means of ordering 
decertification of the class. 15 Part III also details the court's discussion 
of Maryland's class action certification rule and the problems inher-
ent in tobacco litigation that will likely eliminate the certification of 
similar class actions in Maryland in the future. 16 Part IV discusses the 
viability of class action certification for general mass tort claims in 
other jurisdictions and the reasons for their success or failure as com-
pared to the court's rationale in Angeletti. 17 In addition, Part IV details 
the court of appeals' use of the writ of mandamus as a means of avoid-
ing the final judgment rule18 and offers suggestions to reduce the use 
of mandamus in this way. 19 This Comment concludes that Angeletti 
virtually extinguishes any hope for plaintiffs of successful litigation of 
tobacco claims in Maryland, whether via class action litigation or oth-
erwise, and warns potential similarly situated litigants of the court of 
9. /d. at 699, 703, 752 A.2d at 205, 208. 
10. See infra note 259 and accompanying text (noting that the Maryland rules 
lack the interlocutory appeal provision available in the federal class action 
rule). 
11. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 699, 752 A.2d at 205. 
12. See id. at 729-30, 752 A.2d at 222; see also infra Part III.C. 
13. See infra Part II.A-B. 
14. See infra Part II.B-C. 
15. See infra Part liLA-B. 
16. See infra Part III.C. 
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. See infra notes 265-70 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra Part IV.D. 
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appeals' ability to review and decertify such class action suits at 
anytime.20 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CLASS ACTION IN MARYLAND 
Even before specific rules were enacted defining class action as a 
litigation device, representative litigation existed.21 The earliest re-
cord of representative litigation in Maryland is the 1852 case of Negro 
jerry v. Townshenrf22 in which two slaves petitioned for their freedom 
on behalf of themselves and other slaves. 23 This case demonstrates an 
early example of representative litigation because the plaintiffs repre-
sented the rights of others who were not named as parties.24 
In 1880, the Maryland courts explicitly recognized what they called 
the "doctrine of representation" in Bowen v. Gent.25 Under the doc-
trine of representation, the rights of unnamed parties were appropri-
ately protected by the party or parties representing them if the 
unnamed parties were affected by the ruling of the court and if the 
unnamed parties had a common interest with the representative par-
ties who appeared in court on their behalf.26 However, courts hesi-
tated to utilize the doctrine because they were concerned that each 
individual claiming harm should be a party to the litigation in order 
to ensure the protection of his interests. 27 The doctrine of represen-
tation was in contrast to the general rule that all those whose interests 
could be affected by adjudication should be made parties to the ac-
tion, unless doing so would be too difficult or inconvenient. 28 
Over thirty years after Bowen and the introduction of the doctrine of 
representation, the Court of Appeals of Maryland outlined the funda-
mental concepts behind what would eventually become the modern 
class action rule.29 In Leviness v. Consolidated Gas Electric Light & Power 
20. See infra Part V. 
21. See Ian Gallacher, Representative Litigation in Maryland: The Past, Present and 
Future of the Class Action Rule in State Court, 58 Mo. L. REv. 1510, 1515 
(1999); see also infra note 26 and accompanying text (describing the doc-
trine of representation). 
22. 2 Md. 274 (1852). 
23. Id.; see also Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1515-16. 
24. See generally Negro jerry, 2 Md. at 274; Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1518. 
25. 54 Md. 555 (1880). Bowen involved a series of claims filed regarding the 
sale of land held as tenants in common. !d. at 556-57. The court held that 
a co-tenant's interest was not properly represented in an earlier suit and, 
therefore, he was not bound by the prior decision. Id. at 570-71. 
26. See id. 
27. See Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1518-19. 
28. See id. The concept of inconvenience is today embodied in the goal of judi-
cial economy. See infra Part IV.C. These concerns remain extremely rele-
vant in modern class action litigation, especially in the area of mass torts. 
See infra Part IV.C. 
29. See Leviness v. Canso!. Gas Elec. Light & Power Co., 114 Md. 559, 567-68, 80 
A. 304, 307 (1911). 
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Co., the court held that the use of the doctrine of representation was 
appropriate in the following situations: 
( 1) Where the question is one of a common or general inter-
est, and one or more sue or defend for the benefit of the 
whole; (2) where the parties form a voluntary association for 
public or private purposes, and those who sue or defend may 
fairly be presumed to represent the rights and interests of 
the whole; (3) where the parties are very numerous and 
though they have or may have separate and distinct interests, 
yet it is impractical to bring them all before the Court.30 
As outlined in Leuiness, the doctrine of representation resembles 
the modern class action device in some ways. 31 Both require that the 
representative plaintiff adequately represent the rights and claims of 
the other plaintiffs,32 that the representative plaintiff have interests in 
common with the other plaintiffs,33 and that the number of plaintiffs 
represented be large enough such that individual litigation would be 
inefficient or impractical.34 
While this comparison shows that efficiency, or judicial economy, 
has always been an element of representative litigation, arguably the 
litigation device also developed as a means of giving parties greater 
access to the courts. Certain parties may have had access to the courts 
through representative litigation based on the common law right 
under the doctrine of representation, but Maryland did not codify the 
right until 1961.35 
A. Statutory Right to Class Action in Maryland 
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2336 ("Federal Rule") 
codified the use of class action in federal court in 1938, Maryland had 
30. !d. (quoting section 97 of Story's Equity Pleading). Concepts of the modern 
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy are 
each represented within the early rule. See infra Part II.B for a discussion 
of the modern requirements. 
31. See infra note 43 (quoting the full text of Maryland Rule 2-231); see also 
Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1520 (noting that the doctrine of representa-
tion and the modern class action device also differ regarding notice re-
quirements, use in equity versus law courts, and dismissal procedures). 
Compare supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine 
of representation), with Mo. R. 2-231. 
32. Compare Mo. R. 2-231(a)(4), with Leviness, 114 Md. at 567-68, 80 A. at 307. 
33. Compare Mo. R. 2-231(a)(4), with Leviness, 114 Md. at 567-68, 80 A. at 307. 
34. Compare Mo. R. 2-231 (a) ( 4), with Leviness, 114 Md. at 567-68, 80 A. at 307. 
See also FED. R. Cw. P. 23(a) (requiring that a class be numerous enough 
that joinder is impractical). 
35. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
36. Federal Rule 23 states: 
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a 
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all 
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the 
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class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the represen-
tative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class. 
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a 
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and 
in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against 
individual members of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsis-
tent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of 
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct 
for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect 
to individual members of the class which would as a practical mat-
ter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties 
to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability 
to protect their interests; or (2) the party opposing the class has 
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, 
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or correspond-
ing declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or (3) the 
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only in-
dividual members, and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the con-
troversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the 
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and na-
ture of any litigation concerning the controversy already com-
menced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or 
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in 
the management of a class action. 
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Main-
tained; Notice; judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Ac-
tions. (1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an 
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order 
whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision 
may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the 
decision on the merits. (2) In any class action maintained under 
subdivision (b)(3}, the court shall direct to the members of the 
class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including 
individual notice to all members who can be identified through 
reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) 
the court will exclude the member from the class if the member so 
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable 
or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and 
(C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if the mem-
ber desires, enter an appearance through counsel. (3) The judg-
ment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision 
(b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall in-
clude and describe those whom the court finds to be members of 
the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action 
under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to the class, 
shall include and specifY or describe those to whom the notice pro-
vided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not re-
quested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the 
class. ( 4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or 
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) 
a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a 
107 
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no statutory right to class action until over twenty years later in 1961 
when it adopted Rule 209.37 Perhaps because Rule 209 was not as 
class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and 
applied accordingly. 
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to 
which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: ( 1) 
determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to 
prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of 
evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the 
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the ac-
tion, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to 
some or all of the members of any step in the action or of the 
proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of mem-
bers to signify whether they consider the representation fair and 
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise 
to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the represen-
tative parties or on intervenors; ( 4) requiring that the pleadings be 
amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of 
absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) deal-
ing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined 
with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as 
may be desirable from time to time. 
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed 
or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of 
the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all mem-
bers of the class in such manner as the court directs. 
(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an ap-
peal from an order of a district court granting or denying class ac-
tion certification under this rule if application is made to it within 
ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does not stay proceed-
ings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of 
appeals so orders. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
37. Maryland Rule 209 stated: 
a. When Allowed. When there is a question of law or fact common 
to persons of a numerous class whose joinder is impracticable, one 
or more of them whose claims or defenses are representative of the 
claims or defenses of all and who will fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of all may sue or be sued on behalf of all. 
b. Elimination of Representative Character. Except where a class ac-
tion is maintained of right, the court may adjudicate and declare 
the non-representative character of the action and render judg-
ment specifically determining that only the parties to the action are 
bound thereby. 
c. Protective Orders-Notice. The court at any stage of the action may 
impose such terms as shall fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of the persons on whose behalf the action is brought or de-
fended, including an order that notice be given in such a manner 
as it may direct: (1) of the pendency of the action, (2) of a pro-
posed settlement, (3) of rendition of judgment, (4) to come in and 
present claims, or (5) of any other proceedings in the action. 
d. Court Approval for Compromise or Dismissal. Except with the ap-
proval of the court, a class action shall not be compromised or 
dismissed. 
Mo. R. 209 (1961) (repealed 1984). 
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instructive as the federal rule, the Maryland courts often referred to 
federal class action cases when deciding certain issues.38 
In johnson v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,39 the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland looked for guidance in interpreting its own class action stat-
ute and followed the United States Supreme Court case of Eisen v. 
Carlisle & jacquelin. 40 In following Eisen, the court in johnson held that 
the class should incur the cost of providing notice to class members 
and that the trial court should not inquire into the merits of the litiga-
tion during the class certification phase.41 At the time johnson was 
decided, Maryland Rule 209 directed only that the court should pro-
tect the interests of the class members by giving notice "in such a man-
ner as it may direct."42 By modeling its interpretation of Rule 209 
after federal case law interpreting the federal class action rule, Mary-
land courts seemed to be calling out to the rule-making body for addi-
tional guidelines. Consequently, the Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure ("Committee") responded in 1984 with the 
enactment of the new Maryland Rule 2-231.43 
38. See johnson v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 26 Md. App. 122, 127, 337 A.2d 210, 
213 (1975) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) and 
stating that the Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal Rule 23 is not 
binding, but is persuasive for Maryland courts and that the federal rule is 
substantially more detailed than the Maryland rule). 
39. 26 Md. App. 122, 337 A.2d 210 (1975). 
40. 417 u.s. 156 (1974). 
41. See johnson, 26 Md. App. at 128-29, 337 A.2d at 213-14. 
42. See Mo. R. 209. 
43. See Mo. R. 2-231. This rule states: 
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a 
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all 
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the 
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and ( 4) the represen-
tative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class. 
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. Unless justice requires otherwise, 
an action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of 
section (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of 
separate actions by or against individual members of the class 
would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with 
respect to individual members of the class that would establish in-
compatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, 
or (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the 
class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests 
of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substan-
tially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or (2) 
the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to 
the class as a whole; or (3) the court finds that the questions of law 
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members and that a class action 
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient ad-
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judication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the find-
ings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in 
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate ac-
tions, (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 
controversy already commenced by or against members of the 
class, (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the liti-
gation of the claims in the particular forum, (D) the difficulties 
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. 
(c) Certification. On motion of any party or on the court's own 
initiative, the court shall determine by order as soon as practicable 
after commencement of the action whether it is to be maintained 
as a class action. A hearing shall be granted if requested by any 
party. The order shall include the court's findings and reasons for 
certifying or refusing to certify the action as a class action. The 
order may be conditional and may be altered or amended before 
the decision on the merits. 
(d) Partial Class Actions; Subclasses. When appropriate, an action 
may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to par-
ticular issues, or a class may be divided into subclasses and each 
subclass treated as a class. 
(e) Notice. In any class action, the court may require notice pur-
suant to subsection (f) (2). In a class action maintained under sub-
section (b) (3), notice shall be given to members of the class in the 
manner the court directs. The notice shall advise that ( 1) the 
court will exclude from the class any member who so requests by a 
specified date, (2) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will in-
clude all members who do not request exclusion, and (3) any 
member who does not request exclusion and who desires to enter 
an appearance through counsel may do so. 
(f) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to 
which this Rule applies, the court may enter appropriate orders: 
(1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing mea-
sures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presenta-
tion of evidence or argument, (2) requiring, for the protection of 
the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the 
action, that notice be given in the manner the court directs to 
some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the 
proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of mem-
bers to signify whether they consider the representation fair and 
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise 
to come into the action, (3) imposing conditions on the represen-
tative parties or intervenors, ( 4) requiring that the pleadings be 
amended to eliminate allegations as to representation of absent 
persons, and that the action proceed accordingly, (5) dealing with 
similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an 
order under Rule 2-504, and may be altered or amended as may be 
desirable from time to time. 
(g) Discovery. For purposes of discovery, only representative par-
ties shall be treated as parties. On motion, the court may allow 
discovery by or against any other member of the class. 
(h) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dis-
missed or compromised without the approval of the court. Notice 
of a proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all mem-
bers of the class in the manner the court directs. 
(i) Judgment. The judgment in an action maintained as a class 
action under subsections (b)(1) and (2), whether or not favorable 
to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds 
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B. Class Action Certification Under Maryland Rule 2-231 
The Committee modeled Maryland Rule 2-231 almost entirely after 
Federal Rule 23.44 As such, Maryland courts often refer to federal 
decisions for guidance when the Maryland rule fails to adequately ad-
dress an issue.45 Thus, case law interpreting Federal Rule 23 may also 
be used as a guide to interpreting Maryland Rule 2-231.46 Under both 
Maryland Rule 2-231 and Federal Rule 23, class actions are maintain-
able only if the action meets the four threshold requirements of 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.47 
1. Numerosity 
The numerosity requirement necessitates that the class be so nu-
merous that 'joinder of all members is impracticable."48 The rules 
require no specific number oflitigants, and courts have held that satis-
faction of this requirement hinges on the facts of each case.49 Classes 
with as few as twenty-five or thirty members have met the numerosity 
requirement. 5° Courts generally use a common sense approach in de-
termining whether joinder of the parties reaches the required "im-
/d. 
to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained 
as a class action under subsection (b) (3), whether or not favorable 
to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the 
notice provided in subsection (e) ( 1) was directed, and who have 
not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members 
of the class. 
44. See Md. R. 2-231 source note (listing the sections of Maryland Rule 2-231 
derived from Federal Rule 23). Section g is the only section not derived 
from the federal rule. /d. Compare Mo. R. 2-231 with FED. R. Cw. P. 23. 
45. See, e.g., Snowden v. Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 300 Md. 555, 479 A.2d 1329 
(1984). Because Maryland Rule 2-231 does not address the appealability of 
class certifications, the court of appeals looked to a federal class action case, 
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), to determine whether an 
order denying class certification was appealable. /d. at 562-63, 479 A.2d 
1332-33. Livesay held that even if a denial of class certification sounded the 
"'death-knell'" of the litigation, an order denying certification was not ap-
pealable as a matter of right, but possibly could be appealable under the 
Federal Interlocutory Appeals Act. /d. Because Maryland has no similar act 
regarding interlocutory appeals, the court in Snowden held that class certifi-
cation orders were not appealable. /d. at 567, 479 A.2d at 1335. 
46. See Pollokoff v. Md. Nat'! Bank, 288 Md. 485, 491, 418 A.2d 1201, 1205 
(1980) (analyzing the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Fed-
eral Rule 23, in the context of aggregation of claims, for guidance in the 
interpretation of Maryland Rule 209, the precursor to the current Maryland 
Rule 2-231). 
47. FED. R. Cw. P. 23(a); Mo. R. 2-231(a). 
48. Mo. R. 2-231. 
49. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the N.W., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980). 
50. See In re Kirschner Med. Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F.R.D. 74, 78 (D. Md. 1991) 
(stating that a case with twenty-five to thirty plaintiffs would be impractical 
to litigate as a joinder, but not providing a strict numerical standard for 
such a case) . 
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practicable" standard.51 Requiring numerosity primarily serves to 
ensure that the class action prevails as necessary and more judicially 
economical than joinder of the parties and claims.52 Enforcing the 
numerosity requirement also provides persons with small claims a 
greater opportunity for access to the courts.53 
2. Commonality 
The Maryland rule also requires that the claims of the class mem-
bers contain common questions of law or fact. 54 This requirement 
ensures uniform decisions with respect to common issues, and pro-
motes convenience and judicial economy. 55 Even a single common 
issue of law or fact may adequately bind the members together as a 
class for litigation under this requirement.56 An issue should be 
viewed as common "only to the extent its resolution will advance the 
litigation of the entire case."57 
Achieving commonality requires only that common issues exist -
not that they predominate the claims of the class members.58 Al-
though similar to the Rule 2-231 (b) (3) requirement of predomi-
nance59 of common issues over individual issues, the commonality 
requirement under Rule 2-231 (a) is less stringent and is easily met in 
most cases. 60 
3. Typicality 
The -requirement of typicality makes certain that the claims or de-
fenses of the class representatives encompass the typical claims or de-
fenses of the rest of the class.61 In determining whether this 
requirement exists in a particular case, courts use a common sense 
inquiry into whether the interests of the plaintiffs represent the inter-
ests of the rest of the class.62 There must be "similar legal and reme-
dial theories underlying the representative claims and the claims of 
51. See Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1558-59. 
52. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 732, 752 A.2d 200, 223 
(2000). 
53. See id. 
54. See Mo. R. 2-231 (a). 
55. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 734, 752 A.2d at 225. 
56. See id. at 736, 752 A.2d at 226. 
57. !d. 
58. See id. at 734, 752 A.2d at 225. 
59. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text (explaining the predominance 
requirement). 
60. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 734, 737, 752 A.2d at 225-26. 
61. See Mo. R. 2-231(a). 
62. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 737-38, 752 A.2d at 227. 
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the class."63 Although each plaintiff's case may be factually different, 
the typicality requirement may still be met. 64 
Requiring typicality also ensures that the claims of the class repre-
sentatives embody the best interests of those less active in the litiga-
tion.65 Essentially, the representative must be able to prove the class 
members' cases by proving her own case.66 
4. Adequacy of Representation 
Maryland Rule 2-231 (a) provides in part that the "representative 
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."67 
The adequacy of representation requirement actually addresses two 
concerns: 1) that the class representatives have no conflict with the 
rest of the class members, allowing each representative to vigorously 
pursue the action on behalf of the other members, and 2) that the 
attorney representing the class will do so with vigor and diligence.68 
In considering whether representation is "adequate," courts analyze 
conflicts of interest, determine whether representatives and members 
share interests, and determine whether a harmony exists between the 
goals of the class members, representatives, and counsel.69 
Adequacy of representation ensures due process for the absent class 
members and makes certain that the representatives, not the attorneys 
for the class, control the litigation. 7° Class representatives must also 
possess reasonable knowledge of the cause of action and the specifics 
of the case in order to preserve due process of the absent class mem-
bers. 71 Courts have refused to certify a class when a representative 












See id. at 740, 752 A.2d at 228 (citing Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 
888, 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)). The court in Angeletti stated that al-
though the typicality requirement has been met, any concerns regarding 
factual differences in each plaintiff's case should be addressed under the 
predominance inquiry. !d. 
See id. at 737, 752 A.2d at 226. 
See Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1560-61; see also ScottS. Partridge & Kerry J. 
Miller, Some Practical Considerations far Defending and Settling Products Liability 
and Consumer Class Actions, 74 TuL. L. REv. 2125, 2136-37 (2000). Many 
courts have denied class certification of mass tort cases for this reason be-
cause such cases often involve issues of injury, causation, and affirmative 
defenses. See id. 
Mo. R. 2-231 (a). 
See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 740-41, 752 A.2d at 228; see also Partridge & Miller, 
supra note 66, at 2137-38. 
See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 741-42, 752 A.2d at 229. 
See Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1562. Due process requires that the class 
representative take an active role in the litigation in order to protect the 
interests of the class members and ensure that attorneys do not become the 
driving force of the litigation. See id. 
See Partridge & Miller, supra note 66, at 2139. 
See, e.g., White v. Ensearch Corp., 78 F.R.D. 547, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (re-
fusing class action status because the plaintiff had almost a total lack of 
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C. Classification Under Maryland Rule 2-23l(b)(3) 
If a class meets each requirement of numerosity, commonality, typi-
cality, and adequacy, it must also be certified under section (b) of 
Maryland Rule 2-231. 73 Although four categories of certification exist, 
the (b) (3) class is the most commonly utilized in mass tort cases.74 
Under 2-231 (b) (3), the court must find that common questions of 
law or fact predominate over individual issues, and that a class action 
is superior to other methods of adjudication in order to certify the 
class.75 Thus, certification under 2-231 (b) (3) generally hinges on the 
issues of predominance and superiority. 76 
1. Predominance 
The predominance test is practical77 but much more demanding 
than the commonality requirement of 2-231 (a).78 The predominance 
inquiry "focuses on the number and significance of common ques-
tions as opposed to individual issues. "79 
Achievement of judicial economy often depends on the satisfaction 
of this requirement.80 Because individual issues of causation, dam-
ages, and defenses are usually specific to each plaintiff, most courts 
hold that certifying some mass tort suits as class actions defeats the 
underlying purpose of preserving judicial economy.81 Although the 
text of the rule does not explicitly prohibit the exclusion of mass tort 
claims from class certification,82 many courts look unfavorably upon 
knowledge about the basis of the suit); see also Butterworth v. Quick & 
Reilly, Inc., 171 F.R.D. 319, 323 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (denying class certifica-
tion because a representative was not knowledgeable enough about the 
case to fairly represent the class members). 
73. Mo. R. 2-231(b). 
74. See James W. Elrod, The Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Toxic Pollution 
Torts, 56 TENN. L. REv. 243, 259-67 (1988). This Comment addresses only 
the (b) (3) category. Other categories under the rule are: the (b) (1) (A) 
class used by parties wishing to defend against multiple adjudications, not 
for the benefit of the class members; the (b) (1 )(B) class used in "limited 
fund" situations; and the (b)(2) class used primarily in cases in which equi-
table relief is sought. See id. 
75. Mo. R. 2-231(b)(3). 
76. See Elrod, supra note 74, at 267. 
77. Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1591 (stating that this prong of the test is 
pragmatic). 
78. See Mn. R. 2-231(a); Angeletti, 358 Md. at 743, 752 at 231. 
79. See Partridge & Miller, supra note 66, at 2139. 
80. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 743, 752 A.2d at 229-30 (citing Valentino v. Carter-
Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
81. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 762, 752 A.2d at 240. But see supra Part IV.C. 
82. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (discussing 
the rationale of the Advisory Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule 23 in 
promulgating the rule). 
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such actions.83 As a result, often in mass tort litigation, class actions 
fall short of certification because they fail this test.84 
2. Superiority 
The requirement of superiority mandates that the class action 
should be the most efficient means of adjudicating the matter.85 Ma-
ryland Rule 2-231 (b) (3) lists factors that should be considered in ana-
lyzing the superiority requirement: 
(A) The interest of members of the class in individually con-
trolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions, (B) 
the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the con-
troversy already commenced by or against members of the 
class, (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating 
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, (D) the 
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a 
class action. 86 
The first factor, the interest of the representative in controlling the 
case, focuses on the principle that "the greater the individuals' stake 
in the litigation, the greater their interest in controlling their own ac-
tions in individual litigation."87 When drafting Federal Rule 23, the 
Advisory Committee stated its reasoning for this consideration: 
The interests of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits 
may be so strong as to call for denial of a class action. On 
the other hand ... the class may have a high degree of cohe-
sion and prosecution of the action through representatives 
would be quite unobjectionable, or the amounts at stake for 
individuals may be so small that separate suits would be 
impractical. 88 
The second factor, the nature of the litigation already commenced, 
looks to the extent and nature of litigation surrounding the claim that 
has already been initiated. 89 If too much pre-existing litigation exists, 
a class action may be unproductive.90 
The third factor, desirability, embodies two considerations. First, 
the court must determine whether allowing the action to proceed as a 
class action would reduce the possibility of inconsistent results.91 The 










See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625; Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 
746-47 (5th Cir. 1996); Angeletti, 358 Md. at 728-29, 752 A.2d at 221-22. 
Mo. R. 2-231 (b)(3). 
/d. 
Angeletti, 358 Md. at 763, 752 A.2d at 240-41. 
FEn. R. Cw. P. 23 advisory committee's note b(3) (1966 amendments). 
See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 764, 752 A.2d at 241. 
See id. 
See id. 
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an appropriate location for the parties in interest, accessibility of wit-
nesses and evidence, and the condition of the court's docket.92 
Finally, the court should consider the fourth factor, manageability 
of the action as a class action.93 At the crux of this factor lies the 
ultimate goal of judicial economy.94 Mass tort class action certifica-
tion generally fails because of the great number of individual issues 
involved, litigation of which, using the class action device, might be 
unmanageable, and therefore not serve the goal of judicial 
economy.95 
III. THE INSTANT CASE 
Although certification of class action lawsuits involving mass tort liti-
gation rarely occurs, some judges have held that certain claims pass all 
of the tests of Rule 2-231 (b) (3) .96 In Philip Moms Inc. v. Angeletti, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland used the extraordinary relief of manda-
mus to decertify a class action tobacco lawsuit, originally approved 
under Rule 2-231 (b) (3) by Maryland Circuit Court Judge Edward]. 
Angeletti.97 
A. Factual background 
The plaintiffs in Angeletti filed their case in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City, alleging that they and similarly situated Maryland re-
sidents suffered various injuries including nicotine dependency and 
injuries caused by smoking cigarettes and/ or using smokeless to-
bacco.98 In a complaint alleging ten counts, the plaintiffs filed suit 
against all tobacco manufacturers and their Maryland distributors, two 
industry trade groups, and a marketing and public relations firm.99 
92. See id. at 765, 752 A.2d at 241. 
93. See Mo. R. 2-231(b)(3). 
94. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 765, 752 A.2d at 242; see also supra Parts N.B, V 
(explaining that the court in Angeletti relies heavily on the concept of judi-
cial economy in making its decision). 
95. See id. at 765-66, 752 A.2d at 242 (citing Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 160 F.R.D. 
667, 681 (N.D. Ohio 1995), which declared that where individual issues are 
great, "this scenario is hardly the picture of judicial economy envisioned by 
Rule 23"). 
96. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 701, 752 A.2d 200, 206 
(2000). 
97. Id. at 699, 752 A.2d at 205-06. 
98. Id. at 699-700, 752 A.2d at 205-06. 
99. Id. In the plaintiffs' fourth amended complaint, eight of the ten counts 
alleged in the amended complaint included tort or contract causes of ac-
tion: fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, negligence, breach of express warranties, breach of 
implied warranties, strict products liability, and conspiracy. The plaintiffs 
also alleged several violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. 
Finally, the plaintiffs urged the court to recognize an equitable cause of 
action they entitled "medical-monitoring," a fund financed by the defend-
ants to treat and prevent future injury to the class. Id. 
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The plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, which Judge 
Angeletti granted. 10° Certification was divided into two classes: 1) Ma-
ryland residents with serious injury and death claims,101 and 2) Mary-
land residents with nicotine dependence claims. 102 The court also 
approved a proposed three-phase trial plan introduced by the plain-
tiffs. 103 Under Phase I of the trial plan, a class action jury trial would 
be conducted to determine whether the defendants were liable to the 
plaintiffs.104 Also during Phase I, the jury would determine factual 
and legal issues and decide whether those issues were common to all 
class members. 105 Phase II would consist of determining issues of cau-
sation and damages for any of the claims on which the plaintiffs pre-
vailed in Phase I. 106 Phase III would involve trial of the issues of 
100. Id. at 701, 752 A.2d at 206 (stating that the class action was approved under 
Maryland Rule 2-231 (b) (3) with regard to the tort and contract causes of 
action, and under Maryland Rule 2-231 (b)(2) with regard to the equitable 
"medical-monitoring" claim). 
101. Id. The circuit court defined this class as: 
!d. 
All Maryland residents as of the date of class notice who have suf-
fered, presently suffer, or who have died of diseases, medical condi-
tions, and i~ury (while a resident of Maryland) caused by smoking 
cigarettes or using smokeless tobacco products that contain nico-
tine, and 1) The estates, representatives, and administrators of 
these persons; and 2) The spouses, children, relatives and signifi-
cant others of these persons as their heirs or survivors. 






All nicotine dependent persons in Maryland who have purchased 
and used cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products manufactured 
by the Defendant Tobacco Companies .... "[N]icotine dependent" 
shall be defined as: 1) All cigarette smokers or smokeless tobacco 
users who have been diagnosed by a medical practitioner as nico-
tine dependent, and/ or; 2) All cigarette smokers who have regu-
larly smoked more than 15 cigarettes per day for at least three years 
and who have made at least one unsuccessful effort to quit smok-
ing, and/or; 3) All regular daily users of smokeless tobacco prod-
ucts for at least three years and who have made at least one 
unsuccessful effort to quit using smokeless tobacco. 
See id. at 702, 752 A.2d at 207. 
See id. at 702-03, 752 A.2d at 207. 
I d. Examples of the factual and legal issues to be determined by the jury 
include: whether nicotine in the defendants' cigarettes and smokeless to-
bacco products is addictive; whether the defendants' manipulated the 
amounts of nicotine contained in the tobacco products; whether the de-
fendants knew and intentionally concealed information that tobacco causes 
disease; whether cigarettes are defectively designed; whether affirmative de-
fenses such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk are applica-
ble under the laws of Maryland; and whether Maryland allows punitive 
damages in such cases. Id. 
Id. at 703, 752 A.2d at 207. 
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causation, damages, and smoking history for each individual plaintiff 
who had proved he was an established class member.107 
In response to the class certification order, defendants filed a Mo-
tion for Reconsideration of Class Notice and to Stay Issuance of Class 
Notice. 108 The circuit court denied this motion upon hearing. 109 The 
defendants then filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/ or Writ of 
Prohibition with the Court of Appeals, requesting that the court of 
appeals order the circuit court to decertify the class. 110 On the same 
day, defendants also filed a motion with the circuit court requesting a 
stay of class notice pending the decision of the court of appeals re-
garding the Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 111 The circuit court de-
nied this motion. 112 The defendants then filed a Motion for a Stay of 
Class Notice Pending Petition for Writ of Mandamus with the Court of 
Appeals.U 3 The court granted this motion, pending the decision on 
the Petition for Writ of Mandamus.114 
In requesting that the court of appeals grant the writ of mandamus, 
the defendants argued that because there could be no opportunity to 
appeal the class certification until Phase III of the trial, both the par-
ties and the judicial system would suffer irreparable harm if, in fact, 
the certification of the class were improper. 115 The defendants also 
asserted that the circuit court committed an abuse of discretion in 
certifying the class under Maryland Rule 2-231 because the class mem-
bers did not meet the prerequisites of the rule, including predomi-
nance, superiority, and manageability.116 The defendants also 
claimed that the circuit court did not consider closely enough many 
of the important individual issues relevant to the certification, includ-
ing contributory negligence, assumption of risk, conflict of laws, 
fraud, statutes of limitations, causation, and reliance.U 7 
In their response, the plaintiffs contended that the court of appeals 
lacked authority to issue a writ of mandamus. 118 They claimed that 
the court of special appeals had "primary jurisdiction" to decide on 
107. !d. At this stage, individual plaintiffs have the choice of proceeding with a 
full jury trial on the issues determined in Phase III, accepting the damages 
awarded during Phase III, having a summary jury trial on the issues deter-
mined in Phase III or initiating proceedings before a special master or mag-
istrate on all of the issues in Phase III. 
108. !d. 
109. !d. at 703, 752 A.2d at 207-08. 
110. See id. For a discussion of the difference between a writ of mandamus and 
writ of prohibition, see Angeletti, 358 Md. at 707 n.5, 752 A.2d at 209 n.5. 
Ill. !d. at 703, 752 A.2d at 207-08. 
112. !d. 
113. !d. at 703-04, 752 A.2d at 208. 
114. !d. at 704, 752 A.2d at 208. One week later, both the plaintiffs and the 




118. !d. at 705, 752 A.2d at 208. 
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the petition for writ of mandamus at this stage of the case.119 Addi-
tionally, the plaintiffs claimed that issuance of a writ of mandamus or 
prohibition should have been subject to the standard of whether there 
was a judicial "'usurpation of power,'" not whether the ruling was 
merely erroneous or based on an '"abuse of discretion."'12° Finally, 
plaintiffs stated that the right to appeal on final judgment afforded 
the defendants the appropriate legal remedy to address any alleged 
mistakes of the circuit court. 121 
B. Writ of Mandamus 
The court of appeals issued the writ of mandamus, decertifying the 
class action.122 In its decision, the court of appeals held that the rules 
governing the appellate process were inapplicable because at com-
mon law, the "writ of mandamus is an original action and not an ap-
peal."123 Therefore, the court held that appellate rules did not apply 
and did not preclude the court of appeals' issuance of a writ of man-
damus.124 Additionally, the court noted that because the writ of man-
damus is not an appeal, the court of special appeals did not possess 
primary jurisdiction over the action. 125 As a result, the court held that 
"under the circumstances of this case" and "in aid of our appellate 
jurisdiction," the power to issue a writ of mandamus rested with the 
court of appeals. 126 However, the court did note the preference for 
the final judgment rule127 and the need for the defendants to demon-
119. ld. at 705, 752 A.2d at 208-09. In support of their argument, plaintiffs cited 
In rePetition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988), which 
held that Title 8 superseded the ability of the court of appeals to issue man-
damus or prohibition in aid of appellate jurisdiction. !d. They also claimed 
that even if appellate review of the certification were appropriate at this 
point in the case, under the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction," the court of 
appeals may only assert jurisdiction if the motion is filed in the intermedi-
ate appellate court, the court of special appeals. See id. 
120. Id. at 706, 752 A.2d at 209. In support of this claim, the plaintiffs stated 
that the judgment and legal reasoning of the lower court were sound and 
in accordance with the Maryland class action rule. Id. 
121. ld. (explaining that because the case was at the interlocutory stage, the issu-
ance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition would be "unnecessary and 
improper"). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 707, 752 A.2d at 210 (citing Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 145, 
680 A.2d 1040, 1047 (1996)). 
124. Id. at 709, 752 A.2d at 210-11 (explaining that Title 8 does not prohibit the 
court from issuing a writ of mandamus). 
125. ld. at 709, 752 A.2d at 211. 
126. ld. at 710, 752 A.2d at 211. The court explained that "in aid of appellate 
jurisdiction" means that the court should have the authority to review a 
potentially unreviewable question by issuing a writ of mandamus or prohibi-
tion. Justification for this authority lies in the potential irreparable harm to 
the moving party and the need to maintain the integrity of the legal system. 
Id. at 711, 752 A.2d at 212. 
127. See infra note 265 and accompanying text (explaining the final judgment 
rule). 
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strate a "paramount public policy interest" to overcome the fact that 
an alternative remedy to mandamus already existed. 128 The court 
held that a paramount public policy interest did exist due to the im-
measurable amount of time and expense to be incurred by both the 
parties and the Maryland judicial system.129 Therefore, the court of 
appeals held that it had the right to issue a writ of mandamus should 
it subsequently find that the class should be decertified upon an ex-
amination of the merits. 130 
C. Merits of Class Certification Under Maryland Rule 2-231 
With regard to the initial four requirements of class certification, 131 
the court first analyzed the numerosity requirement. 132 The court of 
appeals held, and both parties agreed, that because this litigation 
could potentially impact hundreds of thousands of Maryland re-
sidents, the numerosity requirement was easily satisfied. 133 
Regarding commonality, 134 the court stated that "an issue of law or 
fact should be deemed 'common' only to the extent its resolution 
[would] advance the litigation of the entire case."135 Taking this stan-
dard into consideration, the court allowed the finding of commonality 
by the circuit court to stand, but explained that the more stringent 
requirement of predominance of common issues over issues of indi-
viduals would be addressed further in its analysis. 136 
Regarding the requirement of typicality, 137 the court expressed 
some concern with the degree of differences between the plaintiffs' 
claims, and stated that this problem would also be addressed during 
the predominance inquiry. 138 As a result, the court held that the cir-
128. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 712-13, 752 A.2d at 213; see also Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 
86, 90-91, 40 A.2d 319, 321 (1944) (stating that a writ of mandamus should 
not be granted if the petitioner has another adequate legal remedy). In 
Angeletti, the alternate legal remedy was to appeal after a final judgment 
had been ordered, in lieu of this interlocutory mandamus. Angeletti, 358 
Md. at 713, 752 A.2d at 213. 
129. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 722, 752 A.2d at 218. 
130. /d. 
131. See supra Part II.B.1-4 (noting that numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation are the four requirements). 
132. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of 
numerosity). 
133. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 733, 752 A.2d at 224. 
134. See supra notes 54-60 (discussing the concept of commonality). 
135. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 736, 752 A.2d at 226 (citing Insolia v. Philip Morris 
Inc., 186 F.R.D. 535, 542 (W.D. Wis. 1998)). 
136. /d. at 736-37, 752 A.2d at 226. 
137. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of 
typicality). 
138. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 740, 752 A.2d at 228. 
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cuit court did not commit an abuse of discretion in finding that the 
typicality requirement had been satisfied. 139 
The defendants did not dispute the adequacy of the class represent-
atives, and the court did not discuss this issue.140 However, the court 
did address the defendants' argument that counsel for the plaintiffs 
had a concurrent conflict of interest due to another case in which 
plaintiffs' counsel represented the State of Maryland against the same 
defendants. 141 The court found that because the State of Maryland 
had entered into a finalized settlement agreement with the defend-
ants, no conflict of interest existed. 142 Therefore, the requirement of 
adequate representation had been satisfied. 143 
Thus, according to the court, the plaintiffs easily met all four re-
quirements of Maryland Rule 2-231 (a) in the first step of class certifi-
cation.144 The court then turned its attention to the requirement of 
predominance under Rule 2-231(b).145 
1. Predominance 
On examination of the plaintiffs' individual issues, the court first 
considered conflict of laws issues. 146 The plaintiffs argued that only 
Maryland law applied to all class members, as the class contained only 
members who suffered injury in Maryland. 147 The defendants coun-
tered with the argument that the class necessitated an individual 
choice of law analysis for each member because a determination needed 
to be made as to the exact location of the individual when the addic-
tion began. 148 The court stated that Maryland adheres to the lex loci 
delicti rule of tort law, which holds that the laws of the state where the 












!d. The court explained that at this stage of the litigation, the plaintiffs had 
met their burden by alleging that" 'the same unlawful conduct was directed 
at or affected both the named plaintiff[s] and the class[es] sought to be 
represented.'" Id. (quoting 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CoNTE, NEWBERG 
ON CLASS AcrtONS § 3.13, at 3-77 (3d. ed. 1992)). 
!d. at 742, 752 A.2d at 229. 
!d. (stating that some of the class members' interests and the State of Mary-
land's interest conflict with regard to Medicaid expense reimbursement). 
!d. (citing Agreed Dismissal Order, State v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 
96122201/CL211487 (Bait. City Cir. Ct., Dec. 1, 1998)). 
!d. at 743, 752 A.2d at 229. 
!d. 
!d.; see also supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text. 
Angeletti, 358 Md. at 744, 752 A.2d at 230. 
!d. 
!d. (citing the plaintiffs' brief at the circuit court level). 
!d. Lex loci delicti is a traditional conflict of laws principle, and one that only 
a few states still utilize. It requires that "when an accident occurs in an-
other state substantive rights of the parties, even though they are domiciled 
in Maryland, are to be determined by the law of the state in which the 
alleged tort took place." !d. at 745, 752 A.2d at 230 (quoting White v. King, 
244 Md. 348, 352, 233 A.2d 763, 765 (1966)). 
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Laws defines the "place of injury" as "'where the last event necessary 
to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.' "150 The court 
held that without individual assessments, based on the principles of 
Maryland tort law, it would be impossible to apply only Maryland law 
to each individual. 151 The court explained further that because a per-
son exposed to tobacco in one state may experience effects of disease 
in another state and may be diagnosed in yet another state, the class 
of injured plaintiffs may not necessarily be subject to the substantive 
laws of Maryland, and as a result, Maryland may not qualify as the 
place where the last wrong occurred. 152 In addition, the class of plain-
tiffs alleging nicotine addiction may not be subject solely to the laws of 
Maryland because such plaintiffs may have become addicted in an-
other state and simply moved to Maryland, where they remained ad-
dicted. 153 In sum, the court held that because the class included only 
"Maryland residents," it did not necessarily mean that those residents 
were harmed in Maryland. 154 Therefore, the laws of the state where 
the wrong occurred may not be the state of Maryland. 155 
2. Additional Individual Issues 
The legal nature of the claims of fraud and deceit and negligent 
misrepresentation sealed the fate of the predominance inquiry against 
the plaintiffs.156 These claims placed the burden on the plaintiffs of 
proving that each individual plaintiff relied on material misrepresen-
tations of the defendants. 157 Therefore, the court concluded that be-
cause proof of reliance represented a unique issue for each plaintiff, 
individual issues predominated over common issues. 158 With regard 
to the claims of negligent misrepresentation, the court recognized 
150. /d. at 746, 752 A.2d at 231. Because Maryland is one of only a few states 
that continues to adhere to the lex loci delicti principle, reference to the First 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws is proper, although it is only of historical 
guidance in other states. /d. 
151. See id. at 747, 752 A.2d at 232 (citing Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 
F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
152. /d. at 748, 752 A.2d at 232; see also Geiger v. Am. Tobacco Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d 
345, 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (stating that a tobacco case is not a mass tort 
arising from a single accident or event). 
153. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 749, 752 A.2d at 233 (stating that "place of injury" is 
not necessarily equivalent to "place of residency"). 
154. /d. 
155. /d. 
156. /d. at 750, 752 A.2d at 234. The plaintiffs' claims under the Maryland Con-
sumer Protection Act were similar in nature to these claims, and therefore 
were also unsuitable for class action treatment. /d. 
157. /d. at 750-51, 752 A.2d at 234 (explaining that each plaintiff must show 
reliance on material misrepresentations regarding nicotine's addictive 
characteristics, the detrimental health effects of tobacco, the defendants' 
knowledge of and research regarding the adverse effects of tobacco, and 
the defendants' manipulation of nicotine levels in their tobacco products). 
158. /d. at 751, 752 A.2d at 234 (citing the Advisory Committee's Note for Fed-
eral Rule 23, which states that although fraud cases may have a common 
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that determining reliance under this claim would also vary from plain-
tiff to plaintiff. 159 
More individual issues weighed against the prerequisite of predomi-
nance of common issues.160 Those issues included: 1) whether an in-
dividual is either "'dependent'" on or "'addicted'" to nicotine; 2) 
whether the emotional distress alleged in the claim of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress is "'severe;"' 3) whether affirmative de-
fenses such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk apply; 
and 4) whether comparative negligence issues arise, depending on in 
which state the wrong occurred. 161 The court expressed "serious 
doubts" that these and other individual issues related to causation 
would not need to be addressed individually at some point during the 
litigation.162 
3. Superiority 
When determining whether the prereqmstte of superiority had 
been met, 163 the court held that the members of each class had a 
great interest in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of 
separate actions. 164 The court pointed out that the plaintiffs claimed 
in excess of $500,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in pu-
nitive damages for each class member. 165 Regarding the extent of liti-
gation already commenced, the court found that because so few 
individual tobacco cases were currently pending in the courts of Mary-
land, there existed little risk of inconsistent judgments or of a flood of 
individual claims if certification were to be denied. 166 
core, they are unsuitable for class action treatment if there is a material 
difference in the kinds or degrees of reliance of each plaintiff). 
159. /d. at 753-54, 752 A.2d at 235 (drawing this conclusion after reading deposi-
tions from several class members). 
160. See id. at 755, 752 A.2d at 236. 
161. /d. 
162. /d. at 755-56, 752 A.2d at 237 (citing Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 
535, 546 (W.D. Wis. 1998) for the proposition that "[c]ausation remains 
one of the more formidable issues not subject to general proof'); accord 
Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1997), a.ffd, 161 F.3d 
127, 135 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1114 (1999) (stating that 
"[t]he resolution of this 'general causation question' would accomplish 
nothing for any of the individual plaintiffs"); Smith v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (stating that a decision 
finding cigarettes "generally capable of causing disease" would have a mini-
mal effect in advancing the litigation because, ultimately, liability would 
turn on "whether cigarettes caused a particular plaintiff's disease"). 
163. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text (discussing the superiority 
requirement). 
164. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 763, 752 A.2d at 241 (noting that individuals may have 
significant stakes in individual tobacco litigation). 
165. /d. 
166. /d. at 764, 752 A.2d at 241. 
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When considering the desirability of utilizing one forum for resolu-
tion of the claims, the court held that because this lawsuit involved 
many Maryland residents, the present forum of the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City was as an appropriate forum as any other in Mary-
land.167 Also, under the superiority inquiry, because individual issues 
would require many separate and potentially extensive trials, the court 
held that certification of this class would not further judicial 
economy. 168 
Thus, because the elements of superiority and predominance had 
not been met according to the court of appeals, the court held that 
decertification was appropriate. As such, the court issued a writ of 
mandamus ordering Judge Angeletti to decertify the class. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF ANGELETTI 
A. Tobacco Litigation Class Action Suits in Other jurisdictions 
Nationally, the tobacco industry generally opposes class action certi-
fication.169 Mass tort class actions in several states have been struck 
down, and as of the writing of this Comment, only a few have been 
certified and viable to any extent in the United StatesP0 While diffi-
culties in proceeding with a class action of this type present a virtual 
bar to representative litigation of tobacco claims, some modifications 
may exist that would afford both the parties and the courts a more 
efficient and fair litigation process. 171 
Much skepticism exists regarding the certification of tobacco class 
actions. 172 While some courts have held that in most tobacco class 
action suits individual issues predominate over common issues of law 
or fact, or that class actions do not represent the superior device for 
litigating such claims, 173 other courts have found creative ways to util-









Id. at 765, 752 A.2d at 242. 
Id. (citing Emig v. Am. Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 393 (D. Kan. 1998), 
which held that a similar trial plan would not further judicial economy be-
cause it would require many individual trials). 
Tobacco, Lung Cancer Victims Seek Class Certification in judge Weinstein's Court, 
MEALEY's LITIGATION REPORTS, July 6, 2000 (stating that the industry op-
poses certification on several grounds). 
See, e.g., RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996); Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1994). 
See infra Part IV. 
See In reAgent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 1987); 
see generally 3 NEWBURG ON CLASs AcTIONS§ 17.02 (3d ed. 1992). 
See Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
Other courts have also approved use of the class action device to decide 
issues that are common to all plaintiffs. In In reAgent Orange Product Liabil-
ity Litigation, 818 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1987), the court approved a mass 
tort class action solely to resolve a military contractor defense, which was 
common to all plaintiffs. However, the court also qualified the case in stat-
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In Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 175 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit certified a class action in an environmen-
tal toxic tort case.176 While individual issues of causation and dam-
ages existed, the court stated that individualization of issues did not 
justify denying class action certification in mass tort claims. 177 The 
court in Sterling allowed the class action to proceed with five class rep-
resentatives to determine the issue of general causation - whether the 
plaintiffs' exposure to the contamination could have caused the alleged 
irBuries. 178 Although the court noted that its decision to pursue the 
case as a class action would necessitate further individualized litigation 
to determine proof of individual damages, 179 it rejected the idea that 
a need existed for "a more efficient method of disposing of a large 
number of lawsuits" and held that a class action was superior for deter-
mining some issues. 180 
The court in Sterling recognized that utilizing the class action device 
to resolve issues common to all plaintiffs would likely improve the effi-
ciency of handling mass tort cases. 181 In fact, certification on a gen-
eral causation issue may produce three possible outcomes: 1) the 
exposure to a product will always cause harm; 2) the exposure will 
never cause harm; or 3) exposure may or may not cause harm, de-
pending on various factors. 182 If the judge or jury determines that the 
product exposure will never cause harm, further adjudication is un-
necessary.183 If causation is established, individual issues must still be 
heard184 at the risk of trying possibly thousands of cases over a period 
ing that, had the case been based on exposure to toxins in civilian affairs, 
class certification would have been an error. /d. The Third Circuit also 
certified a class action to determine a single issue in In re School Asbestos 
Litigation, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986). In that case, the court allowed certi-
fication for the purpose of determining property damages because, accord-
ing to the court, although asbestos affected several different buildings, it 
affected each building in the same manner. /d. However, the court added 
that because the effect of asbestos on people is unlike the effect of asbestos 
on buildings, personal injury determinations for each individual would be 
required and would therefore not be appropriate. /d. at 1009-11. 
175. 885 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988). 
176. /d. at 1197. The plaintiffs alleged personal injuries as a result of drinking 
water that had been contaminated by chemicals leaking from the defen-
dant's landfill. /d. at 1192. 
177. !d. at 1197. 
178. !d. at 1197-200. 
179. /d. at 1200. 
180. /d. at 1196-97. 
181. /d. at 1197. 
182. See Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 164-65. 
183. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 781-83, 785 (3d Cir. 
1994) (affirming summary judgment against the plaintiffs because the 
plaintiffs failed to prove that exposure to the defendant's toxins caused 
their injuries). 
184. Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1200. 
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of years.185 However, these issues would have to be tried individually 
regardless of the method of litigation. 186 
Clearly, Judge Angeletti contemplated the need for individuallitiga-
tion.187 By approving Phase III of the trial plan proposal, he planned 
to allow individual class members to proceed in one of four ways to 
determine issues such as causation and damages, after having decided 
factual and legal issues common to all class members. 188 While the 
Phase III trials in Angeletti would represent the bulk of the individual 
litigation that the court of appeals claims would be judicially ineffi-
cient, certification to determine common issues in Phases I and II 
might actually sustain judicial economy. 189 
B. Conflict of Laws 
Determining which state's laws apply to each plaintiff factors into 
both the predominance and superiority requirements, and often 
presents additional individual issues to be decided.190 Not surpris-
ingly, courts of other jurisdictions have refused to certify class actions 
based on the necessity of overwhelming choice of law inquiries for 
each class member. 191 
The court in Angeletti relied on the traditional tort principle of lex 
loci delicti in refusing certification and decided that under this princi-
ple, a tort action must be "'governed by the substantive law of the 









See Owens-Illinois v. Levin, 792 F.Supp. 429, 431 (D. Md. 1 992) (hypothesiz-
ing that trying 9000 asbestos cases would take over 100 years); Cimino v. 
Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (stating that it 
could take six and a half years to try 2298 cases); R.Joseph Barton, Utilizing 
Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts: What do the Constitution and Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 WM. & MARv BILL RTs. J. 199, 209 n.83 
(comparing Owens-Illinois with Cimino and stating that "[a]pparently, the 
courts in Texas are more efficient than those in Maryland," but adding that 
regardless of the accuracy of these estimates, trying a large number of cases 
would obviously strain the court system). 
See Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1200; Angeletti, 358 Md. at 760, 752 A.2d at 238. 
See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. 
See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 703, 752 A.2d at 207; see also supra notes 105-09 and 
accompanying text. 
See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text (stating that some courts have 
narrowed the class in order to make use of the class action device more 
manageable). 
See Susan E. Kearns, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 1336, 1369 (1999). 
The Fifth Circuit denied certification of a nationwide class action based on 
the complexity of the choice of law inquiry, which would have required an 
analysis of the tort laws of each state. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 
734, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that determining choice of law for each 
individual would not be impossible, but it would make individual litigation 
more attractive than proceeding with the litigation as a class action). 
Angeletti, 358 Md. at 746, 752 A.2d at 230 (quoting Hauch v. Connor, 295 
Md. 120, 123, 453 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1983)). 
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an injury occurs in another state and the injured party is domiciled in 
Maryland, courts apply the substantive laws of the state in which the 
alleged tort occurred. 193 Lex loci delicti no longer maintains universal 
acceptance, and less than one half of the states continue to adhere to 
it. 194 Maryland considered overruling the doctrine of lex loci delicti in 
lVhite v. King, 195 but refused to do so. 196 Citing the court of special 
appeals, the Angeletti court noted that "Maryland is among the few 
states that continue to adhere to the traditional conflict of laws princi-
ple of lex loci delicti, ... while of merely historical interest elsewhere, 
[lex loci delictt] continues to provide guidance for the determination of 
... questions in Maryland."197 In applying this tort principle, Judge 
Angeletti did not rule out the need for individualized inquiries. How-
ever, the Court of Appeals of Maryland believed that he "simply misap-
plied the [rules of choice of] law," in deciding that only Maryland law 
would apply to each class member. 198 
Like Maryland, Kansas also adheres to the tort principles of lex loci 
delicti. 199 The United States District Court for the District of Kansas 
also refused to certify a class action brought by Kansas smokers in Emig 
v. American Tobacco Co.200 To avoid related choice of law problems, 
the plaintiffs sought to limit members of the class to persons whose 
claims were "properly disposed of under Kansas law."201 The court 
reasoned that in their attempt to narrow the class for choice of law 
purposes, the plaintiffs overlooked the difficulty in determining 
whether each class member's injury actually occurred in Kansas.202 If, 
for example, addiction were the alleged injury, each member would 
have to prove they became addicted to tobacco in Kansas through in-
dividual hearings with opportunities for the defendant to cross-
examine.203 
Even the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
recognized that Maryland lags behind in utilizing its current tort prin-
ciple, asserting that "against what may be the general trend of latter 
times toward 'significant relationship' analysis, [Maryland] appears 
193. /d. at 745,752 A.2d at 230 (citing White v. King, 244 Md. 348,352, 223 A.2d 
763, 765 (1966)). 
194. See Guitierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 316, 316 n.2 (Tex. 1979) (citing 
case law from each state and listing the jurisdictions that have rejected lex 
loci delictz) . 
195. 244 Md. 348, 354-57, 223 A.2d 763, 765-67 (1966). 
196. /d. at 355, 223 A.2d at 767; see also Guitierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 316 n.2. 
197. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 745 n.25, 752 A.2d at 231 n.25 (citing Black v. Leather-
wood, 92 Md. App. 27, 41, 606 A.2d 295, 301, cert. denied, 327 Md. 626, 612 
A.2d 257 (1992)). 
198. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 747, 752 A.2d at 232. 
199. See Emig v. Am. Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 394 (D. Kan. 1988). 
200. /d. at 395. 
201. /d. at 393-94. 
202. /d. at 394. 
203. /d. 
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rather steadfastly to have adhered to lex loci [delicti] as the ordering 
principle in tort cases."204 One remedy for alleviating choice of law 
problems could involve Maryland adopting the "significant relation-
ship" analysis205 over the antiquated doctrine of lex loci delicti. 206 The 
significant relationship analysis is derived from section 145 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and states, in part, that "[t]he 
rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are 
determined by the local law of the state which ... has the most signifi-
cant relationship to the occurrence and the parties."207 This approach 
may offer a more rational and flexible guideline for courts when de-
ciding conflicts issues. 208 
Florida adheres to the significant relationship analysis when analyz-
ing choice of law in tort actions.209 Coincidentally, at least one class 
action tobacco lawsuit has, to date, been successfully certified by the 
Florida courts, with certain modifications.210 
1. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle 
In a 1996 Florida class action case, plaintiffs brought a products lia-
bility action against RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Company and other to-
bacco manufacturers.211 Those plaintiffs sought damages for alleged 
addictions and various other claims, similar to those of the plaintiffs in 
Angeletti.212 The trial court in Engle certified the class of plaintiffs in-
cluding "' [a]ll United States citizens ... who have suffered ... from 
diseases and medical conditions caused by their addiction to ciga-
rettes ... .' "213 The defendants appealed the order of certification.214 
On interlocutory appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal held 












Farwell v. Un, 902 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1990). 
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws§ 145 (1971). 
See Guitierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 318 (noting other appropriate conflicts theories 
may be available including the "governmental interests" test, the "func-
tional approach," the "principles of preference," the "better law" theory, 
and "choice-influencing considerations"). 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws§ 145 (emphasis added). 
See Guitierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 318 (discarding the lex loci delicti principle for 
the more modern significant relationship test). 
See Tune v. Philip Morris Inc., 766 So. 2d 350,353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
See RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1996). 
Id. at 40. 
Compare id. (stating plaintiffs' causes of action as strict liability in tort, fraud 
and misrepresentation, breach of implied warranty of merchantability and 
fitness, negligence, breach of express warranty, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and equitable relief), with Angeletti, 358 Md. at 700, 752 
A.2d at 206 (stating the plaintiffs' causes of action as strict products liability, 
fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, breach of expressed and im-
plied warranties, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence 
and conspiracy). 
Engle, 672 So. 2d at 40. 
!d. 
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ment of the Florida class action rule. 215 Similar to Maryland Rule 2-
231, the Florida class action rule is modeled after Federal Rule 23.216 
However, in affirming the trial court's order of certification, the Engle 
court held that by reducing the class to "manageable proportions" 
and restricting members to "Florida citizens and residents," the class 
action could proceed.217 By narrowing the class to include only Flor-
ida residents, the class action presumably met all requirements under 
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(b) (3). Although the court in 
Engle did not discuss potential issues of determining choice of law for 
each class member,218 and it appears from the case that the defend-
ants did not argue choice oflaw, one may assume that, under Florida's 
significant relationship test, 219 Florida law applied to all class 
members. 
2. Broin v. Philip Morris Co. 
While the court in Engle did not discuss conflict of law issues, at least 
one other Florida class action tobacco case has discussed those issues 
in certifying a class action.220 In Broin v. Philip Morris Co., flight at-
tendants filed suit against tobacco manufacturers alleging i~uries 
caused by inhalation of second-hand smoke in airplane cabins. 221 The 
defendants argued that under the commonality inquiry, different 
choice of law provisions would apply among the class members, 
thereby making the plaintiffs' claims too diverse to litigate as a class 
action, in addition to defeating the commonality requirement.222 
However, the Broin court disagreed and stated the following: 
Conflict of laws problems need not defeat the commonality 
requirement and deprive plaintiffs of class status. Close scru-
tiny of these issues may reveal fewer discrepancies among 
substantive laws of various states than defendants would have 
us believe. Subclasses can be utilized to deal with this situa-
tion should the need arise.223 
215. ld. at 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the plaintiffs did not make 
the requisite showing of superiority under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 
1.220(b)(3)). 
216. See Broin v. Philip Morris Co., 641 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) 
(stating that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220 is patterned after Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23). 
217. Engle, 672 So. 2d at 42. 
218. See generally RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996). 
219. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text (discussing the significant re-
lationship test). 
220. See Broin v. Philip Morris Co., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
221. Id. at 889. 
222. ld. at 891. 
223. ld. at 891 n.2 (citation omitted). 
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As in Engle, the court in Broin found that choice of law issues did not 
bar the plaintiffs from utilizing the class action device.224 In fact, both 
courts condoned the use of subclasses or narrowing the class in order 
to make the class action more manageable.225 
3. Maryland and the Significant Relationship Test 
If Maryland adopted the approach used in both Engle and Broin, as 
well as the significant relationship test, and applied it in a similar man-
ner, many of the issues raised in the predominance inquiry would be 
resolved. For example, the court in Angeletti expressed concern that a 
plaintiff could be exposed to tobacco in one state, show manifesta-
tions of disease in another state, and receive a diagnosis of disease in 
yet another state.226 Applying lex loci delicti, a Maryland court would 
then have to determine exactly where the wrong occurred in order to 
apply the law of that state to the particular plaintiff. 227 As the court in 
Angeletti stated, this poses a difficult task, especially when dealing with 
issues of addiction.228 However, by utilizing the significant relation-
ship test, the court would analyze the applicable law for the same 
plaintiff by determining which state had the most significant rela-
tionship to the plaintiff or the injury.229 Under the significant 
relationship analysis, one Florida court held that even though a 
plaintiff had been a smoker in another state for most of his life, 
because he had been domiciled in Florida for the past ten years, 
Florida law applied, regardless of the plaintiff's primary place of 
exposure to the defendant's tobacco product.230 By narrowing 
the class of plaintiffs to Maryland residents, or an even narrow-
er subclass, and following the significant relationship guidelines 









!d. at 888; see also supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text. 
Brain, 641 So.2d at 888; see also supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text. 
Angeletti, 348 Md. at 748, 752 A.2d at 232. 
!d. at 744-46, 752 A.2d at 230-31. 
See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties in 
determining choice of law for plaintiffs alleging addiction as injury). 
See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text (discussing the significant 
relationship test). 
Tune v. Philip Morris Inc., 766 So. 2d 350, 354-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
(explaining that the burden fell on the defendant to prove that the law of 
the plaintiff's former state of New Jersey had a more significant relationship 
to the action). 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws§ 145(2) (1971) states: 
Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles ... to 
determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place 
where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct caus-
ing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, 
place of incorporation and place of business ofthe parties, and (d) 
the place where the relationship, if any between the parties is cen-
tered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their rela-
tive importance with respect to the particular issue. 
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could easily determine that only Maryland law applies to each plain-
tiff.232 
C. judicial Economy 
While solving choice of law issues may reduce the number of indi-
vidual issues to be addressed in a class action, as the court in Angeletti 
points out, individual hearings for each plaintiff would still be neces-
sary to determine reliance issues and damages. 233 According to the 
Angeletti court, even "' [r] esolution of the common issues in this case 
[would] not promote judicial economy; in fact, in light of the individ-
ual issues a class action in this case will create judicial diseconomy.' "234 
In analyzing whether the plaintiffs met the superiority requirement, 
the Angeletti court held that the case should be decertified due to its 
unmanageability.235 The court relied on several cases from other ju-
risdictions that generally held that where individual issues necessitate 
many individual trials, judicial economy would not be served by certifi-
cation of a class action.236 Other courts, however, have refused to al-
low 'judicial diseconomy" to bar plaintiffs from proceeding with their 
claims as a class action. For example, the court in Engle agreed that it 
must consider the effect on the judicial system when certifying a class 
action; however, the court held that while class certification would still 
necessitate individual trials, a class limited solely to Florida residents 
would not unduly burden the courts and taxpayers of Florida.237 In 
addition, the court in Broin stated that certifying the class would aid 








See Guitierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 319 (stating that most courts would rule as a 
matter of law that under the significant relationship analysis, the law of the 
state where the parties were domiciled would apply if the injury to the 
plaintiff occurred in another state). 
See Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 750-57, 752 A.2d 200, 234-
37 (2000) (discussing additional individual issues, including reliance as an 
element of fraud, and negligent misrepresentation and addiction as 
injury). 
/d. at 760, 752 A.2d at 239 (quoting Smith v. Brown & Williamson, 174 
F.R.D. 90, 94 (W.D. Mo. 1997)). 
Angeletti, 358 Md. at 768-69, 752 A.2d at 244. 
/d. at 242, 752 A.2d at 765-66. To support its position disfavoring class ac-
tions with a high number of individual issues, the Angeletti court cited Emig 
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 393 (D. Kan. 1998), which held that a 
similar trial plan would not further judicial economy because it would 
"greatly complicate the management of the class action." The court also 
mentioned Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 160 F.R.D. 667, 681 (N.D. Ohio 1995), 
which stated that individual hearings are "hardly the picture of judicial 
economy envisioned by Rule 23." /d. 
RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 41-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1996). 
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multiple similar decisions of the issues that were common to the class 
members. 238 
While judicial diseconomy may ultimately prevent class action litiga-
tion of tobacco-related injuries, the court in Angeletti failed to suggest 
any other approach, whether viable or otherwise, for litigation of the 
plaintiffs' claims and only hinted at feasible alternatives after decertifi-
cation. In dicta, the court briefly acknowledged the financial struggle 
many plaintiffs would face if they were to bring their claims individu-
ally against a tobacco manufacturer.239 The court then cited two cases 
in which plaintiffs asserted that individual suits were infeasible.240 
Those courts held that the disparity of resources between the individu-
als and the defendant tobacco companies was "'overstated,"'241 and 
that there existed no "'shortage of attorneys willing to undertake to-
bacco litigation.' "242 Finally, the court added that a possibility existed 
that potential claimants were not filing individual suits because they 
felt they had no compensable injury, or they did not want to stop 
smoking.243 
As a result of decertification, many of the class members in Angeletti 
may never file an individual action, likely because of their lack of fi-
nancial resources. While prohibiting a class action may preserve the 
court's goal of judicial economy, it might not ultimately enhance the 
goals ofjustice.244 Consistent with the original goals of representative 
litigation, 245 the class action device should be made available to plain-
tiffs who want to offset the overwhelming cost of litigation by sharing 
expenses with other class members.246 By sharing expenses the plain-
tiffs may financially be able to sustain the litigation of their claims, 
thereby granting them true access to the courts. 
Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized the impor-
tance of a plaintiff's ability to litigate using the class action device as a 
means of reducing costs:247 "It is a fundamental principle of American 
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less of his or her ability to secure an experienced attorney and ade-
quate funding to match that of the defendant tobacco companies. 
Tobacco litigation is "hideously expensive"249 for both plaintiffs and 
defendants, and often the cases are won by the party who has the most 
money to spend.250 
As evidenced by the differing rationales of Angeletti and both the 
Engle and Broin decisions, courts must inevitably balance judicial econ-
omy with overall fairness to the parties.251 However, while preserving 
the basic elements required under the rules promoting judicial econ-
omy, courts must allow every plaintiff his day in court.252 
D. Writ of Mandamus 
Even if plaintiffs could successfully craft an argument convincing a 
Maryland court to certify their suit as a class action, after Angeletti, the 
court of appeals would almost certainly reject certification long before 
the lower court issued a final judgment on the merits.253 
1. Appealability of Class Certification Orders 
In 1984, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Snowden v. Balti-
more Gas & Electric Co.254 and held that class certification was not ap-
pealable because it was not dispositive of a party's entire claim.255 A 
search for guidance in federal court decisions on the issue of appeala-
bility was fruitless, as Congress had enacted the Federal Interlocutory 
Appeals Act, authorizing interlocutory appeals of class certification de-
cisions in federal court. 256 The lack of a similar provision in Maryland 
forced the court in Snowden to hold as it did.257 
Generally, appeals are limited to final decisions on the merits,258 
and, as of the writing of this Comment, Maryland has not enacted a 
statute or rule that allows for interlocutory appeals of class certifica-
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had never utilized a writ of mandamus to review a class action certifi-
cation. 260 Other jurisdictions had done so, but courts in those cases 
generally only issued the writ when there was an abuse of discretion by 
the lower court,261 the standard required for mandamus.262 In fact, 
before Angeletti, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had explicidy stated 
that it would not issue a writ of mandamus for the purpose of 
micromanaging complex litigation.263 Apparendy, the court has re-
considered this statement. 
2. Abuse of Discretion 
The court of appeals in Angeletti did not address whether Judge 
Angeletti clearly abused his discretion in certifying the class action. In 
acknowledging that Judge Angeletti deliberately and seriously exer-
cised his discretion, the dissent suggested that the majority of the 
court only opposed the result of Judge Angeletti's decision to cer-
tify.264 Certainly the petitioners were entided to an appeal on final 
judgment,265 and therefore, under Maryland statute, the petitioners 
did have an adequate remedy at law.266 While the defendants' first 
opportunity to appeal certification would likely arise only after a "fully 
litigated loss" by the defendants,267 this does not mean that the de-
fendants would not eventually have adequate relief.268 However, in 
summarizing its decision to override the preference for the final judg-
ment rule and issue the writ of mandamus, the court stated that 
"(p]etitioners have demonstrated the lack of other available, adequate 
relief as well as the existence of a paramount public and judicial inter-
est [whichjustifies] the issuance of mandamus, in order to protect the 
appeals of class certification orders); see also Gallacher, supra note 21, at 
1541. 
260. See Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1542 n.166. 
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integrity of the judicial system in this State."269 Due to the potential 
judicial diseconomy that could result from class certification, the 
court of appeals ignored the abuse of discretion standard and issued 
the writ based on projected expense that "both the parties and the 
judicial system of this State [would] incur should the litigation pro-
ceed as a class action. "270 
The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary writ and should only be 
used in "the most extreme cases of discretionary abuse."271 As such, 
without any statutory guidelines allowing for review of class certifica-
tion orders as interlocutory appeals, the court in Angeletti created a 
unique exception in issuing this writ by narrowing the holding to "the 
unique factual circumstances and procedural nature of this case."272 
Unfortunately, the filing of a motion for a writ of mandamus could 
become commonplace for all similarly situated class action defend-
ants, and this could ultimately mean that each similar class action cer-
tification essentially must be approved by the court of appeals. 273 This 
process would not only usurp power from lower court judges, but such 
a process would also fail to promote judicial economy by creating a 
virtual two-step review of the factual issues. More importantly, after 
Angeletti many judges may be hesitant to certifY even the most appro-
priate classes, for fear of being overruled in the same harsh manner in 
which Judge Angeletti was overruled. While the court's issuance of 
the writ of mandamus may effectively undermine the ability of the 
trial court to certifY class actions,274 it could also eventually result in a 
decrease in the numbers of class actions certified. Additionally, after 
Angeletti, only the most ineffective defendants' counsel would fail to 
file a motion with the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus order-
ing decertification of the class. Ultimately, a plaintiff's right to com-
bine resources with other plaintiffs to successfully bring claims against 
the tobacco companies may be at the mercy of only the bravest trial 
court judges, willing to risk being overruled. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While legitimate arguments exist against certifYing tobacco claims 
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the comprehensive manner in which the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land disapproved ofjudge Angeletti's certification ensures that even a 
convincing argument advocating class action certification for tobacco 
claims will likely fail. Mter Angeletti, the court of appeals has authority 
to utilize a writ of mandamus to order decertification, even if the trial 
judge has not abused his discretion in certifying the class. 276 A writ of 
mandamus ordering decertification may also be utilized as a method 
of appealing certification, which is not generally appealable until final 
judgment in Maryland.277 Unless Maryland enacts legislation similar 
to the Federal Interlocutory Appeals Act or amends Rule 2-231 to in-
clude a provision authorizing interlocutory appeal of a certification 
order, a writ of mandamus may become the new method of circum-
venting the final judgment rule in Maryland class action litigation. 
Certainly, after Angeletti, no judge will want to undertake a grueling 
pre-trial certification process only to be overturned. While only time 
may tell exactly what implications Angeletti will have on Maryland law, 
one message of the court of appeals is clear - Maryland courts ada-
mantly disapprove of class certification for mass tort tobacco litiga-
tion.278 The message to potential plaintiffs is not as obvious and is 
perhaps an inadvertent consequence - claims against tobacco compa-
nies are likely to be unsuccessful in Maryland, whether brought as a 
class action or brought individually.279 
The court in Angeletti uses judicial economy as the measuring stick 
for both its decision on the merits and for its decision to issue the writ 
of mandamus.280 A decision based on overall judicial economy may 
place the court's interests in decreasing litigation above the rights of 
plaintiffs to have their day in court.281 More specifically, this decision 
places the court's interest in how taxpayers' dollars are spent ahead of 
the plaintiffs' interest in compensating taxpayers for their injuries. Al-
though dockets seem perpetually crowded and the burden on taxpay-
ers must be considered,282 after Angeletti, perhaps the most efficient 
form of justice is not justice at all. 
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